1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
7 [Filed in category 253. -- Analyst]
3 [see p. 11, category 116. -- Analyst]

suffer a certain amount of damage. The seedlings must therefore be given time to grow strong enough to endure the temporary uprooting. They usually need from 30 to 40 days before they are ready for transplanting. Whenever early transplanting is necessary a technique is employed which is known in the Philippines as *dapog*. The puddled seedbed is completely covered with banana leaves, which are pressed slightly into the mud so that a thin layer of mud spreads over the leaves. On top of this is placed a layer, an inch thick, of rice hulls or finely cut straw. The whole is thoroughly soaked and sown with seeds. The banana leaves prevent the roots of the seedlings from growing into the ground and suffering the usual damage when transplanted, but the seedlings must be transplanted within two weeks after the sowing of the seed.

In the riparian marshes of Sumatra and Borneo—the *lebak* areas—all the land is flooded at the time when the rice seed should be put into the ground. The inhabitants of these districts, however, have found an ingenious solution to their problem: the floating seedbed. They build small rafts of bamboo, reed, banana stems, or the leaf-ribs of the sago palm, on which they place a layer of rush, or some other aquatic plant, and then a thick layer of fine mud. As the water level rises and falls the seedlings have a chance to develop on the float unharmed.

Numerous also are the techniques employed to supply wet-rice fields with the necessary water (see pp. 47–51). These reflect the nature of the terrain, the social organization, and the stage of technical development of the inhabitants. For it is obvious that the cultivation of wet rice on the plains of the Red River in Tongking would require very different techniques from those required on the steep mountain slopes of northern Luzon.

Culture, Types of Land Use, and Population Pressure

One of the most striking characteristics of Southeastern Asia is the great variation in the density of the population (Map, Fig. 1B). This variation reflects differences in culture as well as differences in physical environment. The culture and social organization of a people are intimately linked to their technique and the intensity of their land use, which in turn guide the people in their selection of new land when it becomes necessary for them to seek new homes. The Cambodians, for example, when living in an environment similar to that of the Annamese, do not create the large rural settlements characteristic of areas inhabited by the latter.[28] Likewise, the Madurese prefer to settle in small hamlets or in isolated homesteads (*Einzelhof*) and to till unirrigated land, whereas the Javanese live in large villages and are by preference wet-field cultivators. Again, while the Bontocs and Ifugaos of northern Luzon build terraces and cultivate wet rice as their primary crop, the neighboring Apayaos, most of the Kalingas, the Tinggians, and the Gaddangs have so far resisted all attempts on the

[28] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, p. 94.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL
[See pp. 35ff., category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

Chapter II

THE SHIFTING CULTIVATOR [p. 16]

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The field of the shifting cultivator is known by various local terms. It is called *caiñgin* in the Philippines, *humah* in Java, *ladang* in the Indies as a whole and in Malaya, *taungya* in Burma, *tamrai* in Thailand, and *rẫy* in Indochina.[1] Practically without exception, it is a clearing in either primeval or second-growth forest. The use of grassland is so unusual that we shall limit the following discussion to shifting cultivation on forest land.

As his name indicates, the shifting cultivator does not use the same piece of land every year; instead, he kills or cuts down at regular intervals —every year, every other year, or every third year—the trees of a small forest patch. He burns as much of the woody growth as is possible or convenient. Among the charred stumps and half-burned tree trunks he plants his favorite crops, be they cereals such as millet, upland rice, or maize; or tubers such as yams or sweet potatoes (Figs. 4–10). The latter [243 462] are planted extensively by the *caiñgero*, the shifting cultivator in the Philippines. In planting cereals it is usually the men who take the planting stick to make little holes and the women who drop in a few seeds, using their feet to cover the seed with soil (Figs. 11–13). [134] As forest land is generally free from weeds or grasses and the soil is usually rich in humus and well supplied with the ash of burned plant matter after clearing, it produces a very good, or even excellent, first harvest; the second harvest begins to show a decline in yield, and thereafter the returns diminish rapidly.[2] Grasses and weeds invade the clearing. Rather than battle these, the peasant abandons his old ladang and cuts and burns a new patch of forest (Fig. 15). The old plot reverts, under favorable conditions, to second-growth forest, the so-called *blukar* of the Malays, and is not cleared again for a period, the length of which may vary from 8 to 15 years, or more.

Shifting cultivation is characterized by a lack of tillage; the soil is hardly disturbed, as no plow turns it. There is less labor involved than in other methods of cultivation, and the work is more evenly spread over the year—an advantage where labor is relatively scarce. The tasks involved are cutting, burning, and planting; sometimes simple fencing of the field against animals, guarding—especially before the harvest and usually by women and children—and, finally, harvesting. In addition, there may be some weeding in the first year and certainly during the second.

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[1] In British India *jhum*, *kumri*, *dhya*, *bevar*, or *dullez*; in Ceylon *chena*; in Japan, Korea, and Formosa *karen* (a Japanese term); in Central America *milpa*; in parts of Africa *chitemene*.

[2] Danhof reports for parts of the Lampoeng Districts that a ladang will produce from 15 to 25 quintals of rice in the first year and approximately 5 in the second year. In areas where the second yield shows such a serious decline the peasants usually prefer to make a new ladang—Danhof: "Bijdrage," 1940, p. 199.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
1 [See pp 37 ff., category 241 or 116.--
Analyst]

Shifting cultivation, the most primitive type of agriculture, may be briefly defined as an economy of which the main characteristics are rotation of fields rather than of crops; clearing by means of fire; absence of draft animals and of manuring; use of human labor only; employment of the dibble stick or hoe; short periods of soil occupancy alternating with long fallow periods. Other terms for shifting cultivation are field-forest economy and field-forest rotation. 241 361 311

Shifting cultivators prefer flat land, but in Formosa, the Philippines, Indochina, and Thailand they have been forced back into the hills and mountains and must often be content with fields on steep slopes (Figs. 16, 17). This has led some observers to believe that shifting cultivation is exclusively practiced in hilly or mountainous regions, or that such regions are preferred in this economy. However, in the Outer Islands[3] of the Netherlands Indies, one frequently finds ladangs in flat country (Fig. 18). If the ladang is very steep it is rarely used for more than one crop, so that new clearings must be made every year.

Many shifting cultivators no longer change their dwellings when they turn to new land; they have become sedentary at least as far as their houses are concerned. They may build a hut in the ladang if it is too far away from their village and may occasionally live in such a shelter, especially at the time when the ripening crop has to be guarded against animals, but they will return with the harvest to their permanent houses in the village (Figs. 10, 19–21).

Ladang culture, as is frequently true of any form of agriculture, is intricately interwoven with religion. Magic practices and sacrificial offerings must accompany every step in the culture, even if the people are no longer pagans but, for example, Mohammedans. Friedericy has made a careful study of these magical-religious customs in the Ponre mountains at the head of the Gulf of Bone in southern Celebes.[4] In this region the people live in small permanent villages. Whenever they are in need of new ladangs—every second year—the heads of the families meet to choose new locations. At this stage they try to find out from the spirits if these agree to the clearing of the land that was selected. For this purpose the village headman (*dukun*), or somebody else who is familiar with magic, is sent out to the part of the forest that has been chosen. Here the delegate places betel leaves (*Piper betle* L.), each with a small slab of lime and a piece of areca nut (*Areca catechu* L.), under a tree and expresses the desire of his community to cut the trees and to use the soil. He ends with the wish that the betel leaves and the areca nuts be scattered should the choice 241 787 [361] [824]

[3] I have used the term "Outer Islands" to denote all the islands of the Netherlands Indies not comprised in the jurisdiction of Java and Madura (Madoera). The Dutch administrative term is *Buitengewesten*.

[4] Friedericy: "Ponre," 1932, pp. 1–34; idem: "De taak van het bestuur," 1937, pp. 488–501. For an excellent description of the magical-religious rites that are associated with the agricultural efforts of the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia, see Richards: Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia, 1939, pp. 351–380.

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The Areal Extent of Shifting Cultivation in Southeastern Asia

It is difficult to form an idea of the areal extent of shifting cultivation because of its migratory nature and the fact that it is often practiced in remote regions. The only country of Southeastern Asia in which an attempt has been made to estimate the area used for shifting cultivation is the Netherlands Indies, but even there it was not possible to include all

Table II—Philippine Islands: Illegal Caiñgins Detected, 1914-1940

Year	Illegal caiñgins	
	Number	Area in hectares
1914	895	....
1915	1 198	....
1916	845	....
1917	665	....
1918	776	....
1919	603	....
1920	721	....
1921	1 602	1 429.48
1922	3 110	2 803.55
1923	1 759	1 516.33
1924	1 753	1 396.90
1925	1 762	1 391.29
1926	1 829	1 476.61
1927	2 002	1 743.92
1928	1 774	1 602.95
1929	1 312	1 370.41
1930	3 227	3 279.77
1931	2 534	3 345.74
1932	2 547	5 586.27
1933	2 427	2 831.38
1934	3 207	3 215.46
1935	2 631	2 455.73
1936	2 314	2 510.59
1937	1 967	2 308.24
1938	1 766	2 029.68
1939*	906	1 331.12
1940†	2 646	4 416.56
Total	48 778	48 071.98

Source: Data supplied by the Bureau of Forestry, Manila.
*Six months only, ending June 30, 1939, because of change of fiscal year.
†From July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1940.

parts of the Outer Islands in the estimate. Van Beukering concluded that one-third of all food consumed in the Outer Islands was grown on ladangs; this would require a total of 1,100,000 hectares of land. If we assume that all ladangs are occupied for 2 years and lie fallow for 12 years, the shifting cultivation system would need seven times 1,100,000, or 7,700,000, hectares. This estimate does not include the ladang area under coffee and pepper cultivation. (Rubber, coconut, and benzoin cannot be considered because they are, for practical purposes, permanent crops.)

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
1 [See p. 26, category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

241 Van Beukering allowed an additional 200,000 hectares for coffee and pepper
311 ladangs; so that the total area amounts to about 8,000,000 hectares. If we
134 assume that the population of the Outer Islands increases at the rate of 1½ to 2½ per cent each year, it would double in from 29 to 47 years. This would mean that after about 30 to 50 years 16,000,000 hectares would come within the scope of shifting cultivation.

361 In Malaya ladang cultivation is illegal, but it is practiced in the hinterland well away from roads and railways, in eastern sections of the peninsula. Dobby recently described it in Pahang and northeastern Kedah, near the Thai border.[30] The Sakai of Pahang regularly abandon their primitive huts as well as the clearings when they shift to a new field (Map, Fig. 2).1 The Malays of northeastern Kedah, on the other hand, as a rule live permanently in one place and change only their fields (Map, Fig. 3).1 There are no statistics available on the areal extent to which shifting cultivation is carried on in Malaya, but according to Dobby the system gives way to permanent culture "as the standard of cultivation rises and as the effect of law becomes stronger."[31]

In Thailand shifting cultivation is extensively practiced by the tribes of the mountains of the north and west, on the eastern part of the Khorat Plateau, and on the peninsula. Probably about 1,000,000 people depend upon it. According to the same kind of calculation that Van Beukering made for the Indies, a total of 1,400,000 hectares would be required, or 200,000 hectares annually, if we allow five persons per household and consider that one hectare covers the needs of a family for 2 years.[32]

[162] In Indochina only the tribes of the mountains of Tongking, Laos, and Annam now practice rây, or shifting, cultivation. The people of the plains, Annamese and Cambodians, who represent 84 per cent of the population, practice a more intensive form of agriculture. Gourou has estimated the areal extent of shifting cultivation in Indochina. He states that a rây is used for 2 years and has to lie fallow for at least 20 years, which seems a rather long period as compared with other countries. In addition to its extensive plains, Indochina has a mountainous or hilly area of 580,000 square kilometers. Only one per cent of this land is permanently cultivated. Gourou estimates that about 40 per cent of the mountainous country is suitable for rây cultivation and he assumes that one-tenth of this, or 4 per cent of the total mountain land, is under rây cultivation in any one year.[33] If this calculation is correct it would mean that 23,200 square kilometers, or 2,320,000 hectares, are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. The numerical strength of the shifting tribes shows, however, that this estimate cannot be correct. Their number is not much greater than

[30] Dobby: "Settlement Patterns in Malaya," 1942, p. 222.
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] For an excellent description of the life of the shifting cultivators in Thailand, see Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 148–173.
[33] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 177–181, especially pp. 180 and 182.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

For the other countries we have only censuses and enumerations of 162
differing stages of remoteness. The problem is how to bring the figures up to date by estimation.

We may take it that in the undoubtedly favourable conditions afforded by Southeast Asian countries generally, a 'natural' Chinese population would increase by 1·5 to 2 per cent. per annum (and, remember, at compound interest). But one has to be careful because these immigrant populations are often not natural, i.e. they may have a lop-sided sex ratio and the age structure might be grossly distorted. Thus, to take an extreme example, you might have 800 men, 100 girls under 10, 50 women between 15 and 45, and none others women over 50—giving a crude birth-rate about 10 per mille—and natural increase nil! The Chinese in Malaya have increased by 1·8 per cent. per annum since 1931, and with a 1:1 sex ratio and settled conditions that figure might pass 2 per cent. But elsewhere sex ratio must be considered. All in all, it seems pretty safe to assume a 1·5 increase. But since the definition of 'Chinese' rules out any close estimation of their numbers, this rough-and-ready formula we have arrived at should be applied only where no estimate based on other considerations is acceptable. This is the case only with Indochina, British Borneo, and Indonesia and here it has, subject to known factors, been utilized.[1]

Mr Unger's map (reproduced as a separate folder)[2] will assist us to gain an idea of 'ethnic' Chinese in the region. It must be kept in mind (a warning repeated in Part VII, The Chinese in Indonesia) that it represents only the chief areas of concentration and has no reference to the comparative numbers of the Chinese and native population—the former being only 5 per cent. of the latter.

In Southeast Asia the Chinese are scattered through the countries 361 ●
in which they live, in large towns, villages, peasant farms, planta- 162
tions, and mining communities. Sometimes the Chinese have come to an area already well populated and developed; sometimes they have opened up an almost uninhabited region. Java, perhaps the most densely populated area in the world, has at least three-quarters of a million Chinese, if not considerably more; the coastlands of West Borneo, almost uninhabited before Chinese

[1] I am indebted for these views to conversations with Mr M. V. del Tufo, Superintendent of the 1947 Census for Malaya.

[2] By permission of Mr Leonard Unger and of the American Geographical Society.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

361 162 immigration, are also the site of a large Chinese immigrant community. Burma and Siam exhibit similar contrasts within themselves: between the densely settled delta of the Irrawaddy and the almost uninhabited Northern Shan States (where the Bawdwin mines are located), the two focuses of Chinese settlement in Burma; in Siam, between the thickly populated Menam delta and the Isthmus of Kra, almost empty until the advent of the Chinese.[1] In central Siam the Chinese live closely associated with the Siamese people by whom, until recent decades, they were completely absorbed within a few generations. In Siam about half the Chinese live in the lower delta of the Menam, in the neighbourhood of Bangkok; the remainder of the race are scattered through the country, living in villages and towns rather than rural communities and tending to concentrate in the more commercialized districts. A notable concentration of Chinese, consisting of the more recent immigrants, is to the southwest of Siam, where they work in the mines, on the rubber plantations, and as merchants in the villages.

162 442 443 Apart from the concentration in the Kra Isthmus region, the chief occupations of the Chinese in Siam are the various forms of retail and wholesale trade. The Chinese, in fact, control most of the retail trade in the country. In particular they have the lion's share in the rice distribution and milling, and there is scarcely a commodity from pepper to sugar in which they are not interested as middlemen. They also make up a large part of the class of skilled craftsmen.

167 Most of the Chinese in Siam originally came from Hainan, Mei Hsien, and Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow) in east Kwangtung. The last-named group is apparently in the majority, especially those from Chin Hai, Yao P'ing, Chi Yang, and Chao An.

162 In Malaya the Chinese have a special significance in that they are here the majority community and have been so since before 1941. In that year there were for the whole of Malaya 2,379,000 Chinese as compared with 2,279,000 Malays, though, excluding Singapore, which is virtually a Chinese city, the Malays still outnumbered them. By 1947 they had still further strengthened their position so that they accounted for 2,615,000 of the population, whereas the Malays were now 2,544,000. This outnumbering of the native population (though the Malays themselves have multiplied their numbers several-fold within the last few decades by natural

[1] Unger, op. cit.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

increase and by the reinforcement of Indonesians, mostly Javanese) has given rise to one of the most perplexing political problems in the Far East.

Malaya's Chinese are largely urban and are occupied in trade, but they also supply the bulk of the labour in the tin mines of which they own about a third. There is a large Chinese labour force on the rubber estates where, however, before the war with Japan, they were outnumbered by the Indians. In addition to these occupations, the Malayan Chinese are actively engaged in every branch of the trades and crafts, from agriculture (squatters) and pig keeping and poultry rearing (which they almost monopolize) to the building and skilled artisan trades, tailoring, dressmaking, and cobbling, and managing or working in oil mills, soap factories, shipping firms, sawmills, and many other undertakings. The pineapple industry is entirely a Chinese enterprise.

Most numerous of the Chinese tribes in Malaya are the Hokkiens, after them come the Cantonese, followed by the Hakkas (Khehs), Tiuchius, and Hailams (Hainanese), and in much smaller numbers by the Kwongsai, Hokchius, Hokchias, and others. The Hokkiens, being the pioneer community in Malaya and the principal merchants, are more numerous in the Settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, and the Cantonese more numerous in the remainder of the country.

A census was taken in 1947 for the first time since 1931 and tables and abstracts from this census, together with some observations of the Superintendent, Mr del Tufo, are included in Chapter XXV of this survey. The facts revealed are of key importance and those regarding the sex ratio are highly significant.

In Java the Chinese live throughout the island, usually in cities and towns rather than in the rural areas, and they are the middle-class merchants who control much of the wholesale and retail trade. Commerce and transport occupied 61 per cent. of the Chinese in Java in 1930: sugar processing, food industries, and timber were next among their occupations. In Batavia the Chinese formed 15 per cent. of the total population.

The people of south Fukien were among the earliest immigrants to Indonesia, especially Java. Some of the families have been there for almost two centuries (the founder of the Tsai (Tsoa) house landed in Java five generations ago, in 1753).[1] The Hakkas and the

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 266.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

311 133 241 134 This artificially stirred sediment is agriculturally negative and it penetrates the ditches and drains of rice growing areas, gradually silting them up, often spectacularly raising the local river bed (at Serendah in Malaya, the river bed was raised 21 ft. by sedimentation over the decade 1923-33), as well as sterilising fields on which the silt spreads so that cultivation becomes more difficult as the river can no longer be kept out. The yields decrease and the fields are abandoned, swamp vegetation gradually obliterating signs of cultivation. Round the lower Malacca River may be found signs of the old field bundings within the tangle of swamp vegetation now growing there, a sign of the effects of mining higher in the river whose effluent is obliterating cultivation in lower areas. This type of swamp comes slowly and has all the appearance of nature overcoming men's efforts to farm, but it is fundamentally a result of man-induced erosions or abrasions elsewhere. Thus interference, by mining and forest clearing, with landforms stabilised over long periods, not only goes on by removal of silt and gravels carried from mining areas and topsoils removed by torrential rains on clean-weeded agricultural areas as a mark of transfer of surface materials from one area, but it also causes the obliteration of cultivation and an extension of useless marsh in the areas where this material is deposited.

133 361 Because these tropical marshes occur in zones of human significance, that is, in the flatter areas with agricultural possibilities, and along the coasts where settlement from overseas might take place, they have played a major part in conditioning the distribution of human beings in Southeast Asia. Both the coastal and inland marshes are tree-covered, making it even more difficult to penetrate, control, or cultivate them. Varying degrees of swampiness often account for the ease of development of farming in one place rather than another in Southeast Asia and a broad belt of marsh has generally proved a greater human impediment than any other topographic feature.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

Chapter Twenty-five

PEOPLES, POLITICS AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE setting of Southeast Asia may be summed up as one of extremes of relief (deltaic plains and mountains) and a climate mostly approaching the wet limit for plant life but merging into monsoonal types. To this setting the people have made varying responses, ranging from migrant food gatherers and hunters in the jungles, to subsistence farmers in the plains, but all turning upon woody materials for weapons, implements, house-structures and domestic utensils, upon rice, the cereal of the wet extreme, and upon social systems of communal help. The whole social and economic life has been galvanised over the past century or two by being more and more drawn into commercial and industrial activities developed in response to and on the basis of external needs for the minerals and agricultural products of Southeast Asia, whereas prior to that time the region was touched only by a trickle of traders moving between India and China.

FACTORS IN THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

Several factors account for the difficulty of obtaining firm data to fill in our general picture of the historical geography of Southeast Asia. In the first place, there grew up no strong literary tradition to last through the centuries and record the past in a form other than mythical. Here tradition is largely oral and literature essentially Indian rather than indigenous. And whatever there was of local record and history has rotted away quickly, the climate, the ants, insects and moulds soon destroying anything on wood, paper, leather or cloth. Moreover, in this setting of swamps and forest, the most easily available material is wood, and artistic tradition expressed in wood, whether in carvings, buildings or tools, rapidly disintegrates, leaving little of that sort of evidence which is the basis of our facts about early periods in other regions. Buildings and carvings on stone were not normal expressions of Southeast Asia people where over large areas stone is not easily come by and where

14: Heine-Geldern E-4 (no date) 1942 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

rounded by the abodes of the eight Lokapālas or guardian gods of the world.

In the Buddhist system, too, Mount Meru forms the center of the universe. It is surrounded by seven mountain ranges separated from each other by seven annular seas. Beyond the last of these mountain chains extends the Ocean and in it lie four continents, one in each of the cardinal directions. The continent south of Mount Meru is Jambūdvīpa, the abode of men. Here, too, the universe is surrounded by an enormous wall of rocks, the Chakravāla range. On the slopes of Mount Meru lies the lowest of the paradises, that of the four Great Kings or guardians of the world, on its summit the second paradise, that of the thirty-three gods with Sudarśana, the city of the gods, where Indra reigns as king. Above Mount Meru tower one above the other the rest of the heavenly abodes.[2]

It will be seen that the Brahman and the Buddhist systems, in spite of differences in detail, agree in fundamental traits: their circular form and the arrangement in concentric zones around Mount Meru. An abbreviated image of either of them thus has the same symbolic meaning for devotees of both faiths.

THE CAPITAL AS THE MAGIC CENTER OF EMPIRE

In Southeast Asia, even more than in Europe, the capital stood for the whole country. It was more than the nation's political and cultural center: it was the magic center of the empire. The circumambulation of the capital formed, and in Siam and Cambodia still forms, one of the most essential parts of the coronation ritual. By this circumambulation the king takes possession not only of the capital city but of the whole empire. Whereas the cosmological structure of the country at large could be expressed only by the number and location of provinces and by the functions and emblems of their governors, the capital city could be shaped architecturally as a much more "realistic" image of the universe, a smaller microcosmos within that microcosmos, the empire. The remains of some of the ancient cities clearly testify to the cosmological ideas which pervaded the whole system of government. Fortunately, a number of inscriptions and some passages in native chronicles may help us in interpreting archaeological evidence.

As the universe, according to Brahman and Buddhist ideas, centers around Mount Meru, so that smaller universe, the empire, was bound to have a Mount Meru in the center of its capital which would be if not in the coun-

[2] There usually are twenty-six heavens in all, including those on Mount Meru, but the number occasionally varies.

14; Heine-Geldern E-4 (no date) 1942 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

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try's geographical, at least in its magic center. It seems that at an early period natural hillocks were by preference selected as representatives of the celestial mountain. This was still the case in Cambodia in the 9th century A.D. Yaśodharapura, the first city of Angkor, founded towards 900 A.D., formed an enormous square of about two and a half miles on a side, with its sides facing the cardinal points and with the Phnom Bakheng, a small rocky hill, as center. An inscription tells us that this mountain in the center of the capital with the temple on its summit was "equal in beauty to the king of mountains," i.e. to Mount Meru.[3] The temple on Phnom Bakheng contained a Lingam, the phallic symbol of Śiva, representing the Devarāja, the "God King," i.e. the divine essence of kingship which embodied itself in the actual king. More frequently the central mountain was purely artificial, being represented by a temple only. This was quite in accordance with prevailing ideas, practically every temple in Southeast Asia, whether Hindu or Buddhist, whether built of stone, brick or wood, being considered as the image of a mountain, usually, though not invariably, of Mount Meru. In ancient Cambodia a temple was quite ordinarily referred to as "giri," mountain, and the many-tiered temples of Bali are still called Meru. The Cambodian inscriptions are very explicit with regard to such identifications. Thus, to give an example, one of them says that King Udayādityavarman II (11th century) "seeing that the Jambudvīpa had in its center a mountain of gold, provided for his capital city, too, to have a golden mountain in its interior. On the summit of this golden mountain, in a celestial palace resplendent with gold, he erected a lingam of Śiva."

THE LAY-OUT OF ANGKOR THOM

The actual ruins of Angkor Thom are the remains of the latest city on this site, built by king Jayavarman VII in the second half of the 12th century A.D. As Jayavarman was an adherent of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the central "mountain" in this case was a temple not of Śiva, but of the Bodhisatva Lokeśvara, the "Lord of the World," whose four faces adorn its numerous towers. The city was surrounded with a wall and moat forming a square almost two miles on each side, its sides being directed towards the four cardinal points. There are gates in the middle of each side and a fifth one on the East leading to the entrance of the royal palace. The towers above the gates are crowned with the same four-fold faces of Lokeśvara as those of the central

[3] Although Brahman and Buddhist cosmologies usually ascribe to the world a circular shape, the "cosmic" cities of Southeast Asia, with rare exceptions, affect the square form. It would take too long to explain this apparent, but not very important discrepancy.

14: Heine-Geldern E-4 (no date) 1942 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

temple. Thus, that smaller world, the city of Angkor, and through its means the whole Khmer empire were both put under the protection of the "Lord of the Universe." The cosmic meaning of the city was further emphasized by a curious device. The balustrades of the causeways leading over the moat to the city gates were formed by rows of giant stone figures, partly gods, partly demons, holding an enormous nine-headed serpent. The whole city thus became a representation of the churning of the primeval milk ocean by gods and demons, when they used the serpent king Vāsuki as a rope and Mount Meru as churning stick.[4] This implies that the moat was meant to symbolize the ocean, and the Bayon, the temple in the center of the city, on which all the lines of churning gods and demons converged, Mount Meru itself.

THE CAPITALS OF BURMA

Burmese chronicles say that Śrīkshetra (Old Prome) on the lower Irrawaddy, the capital city of the ancient kingdom of the Pyu, was built by the gods themselves with Indra at their head, built as an image of Indra's city Sudarśana on the summit of Mount Meru, with thirty-two main gates and a golden palace in its center. The remains of the city show in fact a decided attempt at a circular lay-out though complete regularity has not been achieved. It seems to have been an old custom in Burma that each of the capital's gates corresponded to one of the empire's provinces or vassal states. Thirty-two vassals or heads of provinces with the king as thirty-third in the center would of course correspond to the thirty-three gods who reside on the summit of Meru and among whom Indra is king. Thus not only the capital city but the whole empire of the Pyu must have been organized as an image of the heavenly realm of Indra.

In later capitals of Burma the square form was substituted for the circular one though the cosmological principle as such was retained. It will suffice to say a few words about Mandalay, the last capital of independent Burma, built by king Mindon in 1857 A.D. The inner city was surrounded by a wall and moat forming a square of more than a mile on each side, its sides facing the cardinal points. The royal palace, which occupied the center of the city, and more specifically the seven-tiered tower over the throne in the great audience hall, was identified with Mount Meru. There were three gates on each side of the city, twelve in all, and they were marked with the signs of the zodiak, thereby indicating that the city was meant to be an image of heaven with its stars spread out around the celestial mountain in its center.

[4] In the original myth Mount Mandara is used as churning stick. In Southeast Asiatic variants of the myth Mount Meru usually takes its place.

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the latter's man-eagle Garuda. Another noteworthy example of an incarnation of Vishnu was king Sūryavarman II of Cambodia (12th century) who erected his own memorial monument as a gigantic temple of Vishnu: the famous Angkor Vat. We find further the idea of plural incarnation, also known from ancient India. Thus the Pararaton tells us that Angrok (13th century), the founder of the dynasty of Singasari and ancestor of the kings of Majapahit, was an incarnation of Vishnu, begotten by Brahmā from a mortal woman, and at the same time a son of Śiva. King Krtarājasa (died 1316 A.D.), the founder of the empire of Majapahit, is immortalized by a statue representing him as Harihara, a compound of Vishnu and Śiva. Even the simultaneous incarnation of Hindu and Mahāyāna Buddhist deities occurs. Thus, to quote only one example, the Javanese king Krtanagara (killed 1292 A.D.) was considered as an incarnation of Śiva as well as of the Dhyāni Buddha Akshobhya. Accordingly, he became known in Javanese tradition under the name of Śiva-Buddha.

It may be added that the theory of divine incarnation could be used not only as a means to exalt the position of the legitimate king, but equally well as a justification for usurpation of the throne. Thus the above mentioned Angrok, the founder of the kingdom of Singasari, was an usurper with a long criminal career as embezzler, robber and murderer. Yet, in spite of his criminal past, he became king, according to the Pararaton, because he was an incarnation of the gods.

The theory of divine incarnation as found in Hinduism and Mahāyāna Buddhism is incompatible with the doctrine of the Buddhism of the Hīnayāna. This difference in tenets is clearly expressed even in the lay-out of capital cities. In ancient Cambodia a temple formed the center of the capital and thus the Mount Meru of city and empire. In Burma the center of the capital is invariably occupied by the royal palace, and it is this latter which is identified with Mount Meru. In ancient Cambodia either Śiva in his form as Devarāja, the eternal essence of kingship, or the Bodhisatva Lokeśvara, the "Lord of the Universe," inhabited the "central mountain" and from there pervaded the empire. Hīnayānist Buddhism does not recognize an eternal deity. Indra is but the king of one of the lowest heavens, the second one from the earth. He is as little exempt from death and rebirth as any human being, except that his life lasts longer. The same may be said of the inhabitants of the higher heavens. All these "gods" of Hīnayāna Buddhism should more appropriately be called angels. They have no temples and no cults. Thus it is easy to understand why in Burma no temple could be set in the center of the capital city. The adaptation to cosmological principles and

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the deification of the king here had to be attempted by other means. By erecting the palace in the center of the city and by identifying it with Mount Meru, the lord of the palace, i.e. the king became automatically the representative of Indra. We might even say that he was "the Indra" of this smaller universe, the Burmese empire but he held his place only by the magic of parallelism and he was no incarnation of the real Indra as the ancient Javanese and Cambodian kings had been incarnations of Siva and Vishnu.[7] This scheme explains the great sanctity in which the royal palace was held in the Buddhist empires of Farther India. The palace was the symbol of the celestial mountain, nay, more than a mere symbol: it was "the Mount Meru" of the microcosmos Burma, or Siam, or Cambodia. Anybody nearing the palace had to show his reverence by dismounting from his horse, by shutting his parasol, by bowing to the palace spire or even kneeling down. Attempts to exact the same expressions of reverence from British envoys led to endless negotiations and frictions as the latter refused to comply with a demand which they considered humiliating. "King of the Golden Palace" was one of the most important titles of Burmese monarchs. Yet, the fact that the king "was Indra" and therefore ruler of the country only as possessor of the empire's Meru, the palace, involved great dangers. It worked as a constant temptation for would-be usurpers, be it from the ranks of the royal family or outsiders, as the occupation of the palace might be achieved by a coup-de-main with relatively small forces and usually meant the conquest of the whole empire. Many Burmese and Siamese kings therefore were virtual prisoners in their palace which they did not dare to leave for fear it might be seized by an usurper. The last king of Burma, Thibaw, preferred even to forego the important coronation ritual of the circumambulation of the capital to offering one of his relatives a chance to make himself master of the palace while he was away.

In Hīnayāna Buddhism the idea of divine incarnation as justification of kingship is replaced by that of rebirth and of religious merit. It is his good karma, his religious merit acquired in previous lives, which makes a man be born a king or makes him acquire kingship during his lifetime, be it even by rebellion and murder. A typical instance is that of king Nyaung-u Sawrahan (10th century) as told in the Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma. Nyaung-u Sawrahan, a farmer, kills the king who has trespassed on his garden and whom he had not recognized. Thereupon he is himself made king against his wish. So strong is his karma that, when one of the ministers ob-

[7] However, strong traces of the belief that Siva and Vishnu incarnate themselves in the king survive in the coronation rituals of Siam and Cambodia.

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THE "MILLION CITY" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

D. W. FRYER

IN A world survey of cities with a population of one million or more, made in 1931, Mark Jefferson[1] could not include a single representative from Southeast Asia. Since 1945 five cities in this area have attained the million status—Jakarta, Manila, Saigon, Bangkok, and Singapore. Of all the major political units in this part of Asia, only Burma has failed to produce a "million city." In Malaya, the most highly urbanized country, 35 per cent of the population live in towns of 5000 or more, and towns of more than 10,000 increased their population by 52.6 per cent in the last intercensal period, 1931–1947. But the concept of Southeast Asia as an area of rural peoples with a rhythm of life determined by rice cultivation is still largely correct. The proportion of urban dwellers is about the average for the Asian continent, and, except possibly in Java, there are far fewer cities, in relation to the level of population, than in either South or East Asia.

By Western standards the countries of Southeast Asia had only one city apiece until very recently. Most of the other settlements of any size were overgrown villages, and in some degree they still retain aspects of their village origin. In Southeast Asia the evolution of indigenous cities on the Chinese or Indian scale was not possible. Chesneaux[2] suggests that many of the large indigenous Asian cities grew up within "the traditional framework of the great agricultural empires," but in both peninsular and archipelagic Southeast Asia physical fragmentation, reinforced by a great diversity of peoples, hindered the development of large states. Though occasionally established, they were highly unstable and of short duration. The princely houses of the petty native states were insufficient stimuli to city growth, and commerce was equally inadequate. The only effective impulse, as Credner[3] points out, was a favorable combination of trade foci with administrative, military, and religious functions of the highest order. Dependence on changeable watercourses for irrigated rice culture and transportation, and the personal whim of the ruler, produced a marked arbitrariness

[1] Mark Jefferson: Distribution of the World's City Folks, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 21, 1931, pp. 446–465.

[2] J. E. Spencer: Changing Asiatic Cities, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 41, 1951, pp. 336–337, discussing Jean Chesneaux: Notes sur l'évolution récente de l'habitat urbain en Asie, *L'Information Géographique*, Vol. 13, 1949, pp. 169–175, and Vol. 14, 1950, pp. 1–8.

[3] Wilhelm Credner: Siam, das Land der Tai (Stuttgart, 1935), p. 366.

MR. FRYER is Senior Lecturer in Economic Geography at the University of Melbourne, in Australia.

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in city location, and the small extent of states ensured that cities could only be of moderate size, grouped around the *kraton*, or palace. 361

Thus the integration of several small territorial units into a political state was a necessary preliminary to the appearance of the large city. But even the extensive colonial possessions created by the European powers could not, with their comparatively simple economies, support more than one large city each. This was inevitably located at the point of entry. Singapore, however, is anomalous: its external lines of communication have more than compensated for its earlier lack of direct access into the Malay Peninsula.

The large city, then, is a foreign innovation, possessing a high proportion of nonindigenous inhabitants, serving mainly foreign interests, and tacked onto a rural background. The achievement of independence in much of Southeast Asia, and its approach elsewhere, must bring many changes in the relations of the large city with the rest of the country.

Fulfilling similar functions as administrative, judicial, and above all commercial centers, and providing other specialized services mainly for their own inhabitants and the outside world rather than for the country as a whole, the "million" cities thus present many similar features of morphology and development, despite variations in their historical and cultural backgrounds. It is not surprising that the two oldest cities, Manila (1571) and Jakarta (1619), founded in the era of Mercantilism, possess the greatest similarities and are apparently to continue comparable development as the capitals of new states. On the other hand, the two nineteenth-century cities, Singapore (1819) and Saigon (1859), are strikingly different. Bangkok (1782) is the only indigenous city in Southeast Asia that has attained first rank, but until comparatively recently it functioned rather as the focus of what has often been described as an economic appendage of the British Empire than as the capital of an independent state. Though the smallest of the five cities in numbers, Singapore is the most important, both economically and strategically. More than any of the others it serves the whole of Southeast Asia, and its future is perhaps the most obscure.

The Foundation of the Cities

The sites of the great cities were places of little importance, selected by foreigners on technical considerations that had no validity for the indigenous inhabitants. The aim of the Europeans was to create economic bases at tidewater, and only later did the administrative function become equally significant. Singapore was virtually uninhabited, though a flourishing commercial center had existed on approximately the same site some centuries

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361 before. Manila and Jakarta, though located in populous countrysides, arose from minor settlements, and Saigon was nothing more than a village surrounding an Annamese imperial fortress. Bangkok illustrates the arbitrariness of city location dependent on the personal decision of the ruler; for though founded on the site of an earlier settlement, this possessed no particular geographical significance and was unoccupied by indigenous peoples at the time.

361 504 With the exception of Saigon, all the great cities were founded in the days of sail, but, despite the unexacting requirements of sailing vessels, good harbors with safe anchorages, facilities for careening, and easy access into the interior were not readily found in Southeast Asia, where the modest tides of the shallow seas on the Sunda Shelf only occasionally bring deep water close inshore. It cannot be said that the sites selected by the Europeans were always the best. Silting has been a problem, and technological changes have necessitated almost everywhere the creation of virtually new ports close to the old towns to cope with the increasing size and draft of vessels, and to expedite the handling of new export commodities. It is not surprising, therefore, that the indigenous Bangkok has tended to lag behind.

Manila, the oldest of the five cities, is perhaps also the most interesting. It did not begin primarily as a port and commercial base, nor did its early start confer the usual advantages, in spite of the possession of what is probably the best natural harbor in the whole of Southeast Asia. Manila Bay, protected by the mountainous Bataan Peninsula, and with a relatively narrow entrance, gives shelter from the prevailing winds and the occasional typhoons that cross Luzon. Its north shore is formed by the swamps of the delta of the Pasag and Pampanga Rivers, but on the east a narrow strip of plain lies between it and the southern Sierra Madre. Part of this plain is occupied by the extensive but shallow Laguna de Bay, whose outlet is the short and meandering Pasig River. At its mouth were two stockaded Muslim settlements, from the southerly of which the present city takes its name. The potentialities of Manila as a fortress and administrative center were at once recognized, and its splendid harbor and nodality in relation to the productive plains gave it an ascendancy over the earlier Cebu city (1565). But in a colony that was itself a dependency of another colony, and separated from the homeland by two oceans, economic development was retarded.

361 The objective of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the founder of Batavia, was the establishment of an economic base[4] that would free the Dutch East India

[4] B. H. M. Vlekke: Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago (Cambridge, Mass., 1943), pp. 122–123.

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Company from English and Chinese competition and be strong enough to deter native princes from interfering in the Company's activities. Essentially, commerce was of greater importance than administration in old Batavia, though the Company could hardly avoid participation in politics; the recent change of the city's name to Jakarta, the name of the native settlement on whose site the city arose, is indicative of a change of function as well as of political control. The city began its life as a storehouse, which was secretly fortified and after a successful defense against the English and the local ruler was made the nucleus of a new town. Expediency seems to have been the principal reason for selection of the site. Certainly the harbor had little to commend it, and early in the eighteenth century silting was already a problem.

Bangkok is the only indigenous city of Southeast Asia to attain a population of one million, at least in modern times, though Jogjakarta is estimated to have reached this level during the postwar Indonesian movement for independence. The geographical focus of Thailand is clearly in the lower Menam plain, but for four centuries the capital was Ayutthaya, some 60 miles upstream (1350–1767). After the destruction of Ayutthaya by the Burmese, Thonburi, a fort on the west bank of the Menam Chao Phraya, was selected as the new national capital, but in 1782 a further dynastic change led to the establishment of a new administrative capital on the opposite bank, then unoccupied save for a small community of Chinese traders. Situated on a bend in the river some 20 miles from the sea and surrounded by marshland, the site of Bangkok possessed the sole but great advantage of being easily defended.

Saigon, like Bangkok, is a riverine city and tidal port set in a broad alluvial lowland, but it is more than twice as far removed from the sea. When captured by the French in 1859, it was the main political center of the newly colonized Annamese land of Cochin China and consisted of an agglomeration of native huts around the imperial fortress, with virtually no permanent buildings. The French immediately began its reconstruction as a modern city, so that, unlike the other four cities, Saigon has no old core. Nothing is left at present of the native town. Cholon, the "great market" some three miles to the west along the Arroyo Chinois, is an entirely separate Chinese foundation dating from about 1778. Though the cities have now coalesced, each retains its own distinctive character and functions, and the "Région de Saigon-Cholon" is thus a true twin city, unique in Southeast Asia.

Singapore is anomalous in being situated on an island, and, like Bangkok,

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361 it did not arise on a previous settlement. The modern development of the Malay Peninsula could not have been imagined by Raffles in 1819; he intended that his city should achieve pre-eminence by its policy of free trade, which would attract the Chinese entrepôt trade from Batavia. The site selected lay on the south coast of Singapore Island, where the mangrove-lined Singapore River discharged into the sea. Here was situated what was probably the best anchorage in the days of sail; for the roads between Tanjong Rhu and Tanjong Pagar gave good protection from all but south-east winds, and the force of these was broken by islands to the south.

The Old Towns

361 503 The great cities were developed on a plan, rather than allowed to grow haphazardly, but it is hardly surprising that technological and sociological changes have defeated the aims of the early planners. The old towns represented the transplanting of the city forms of contemporary Europe to South-east Asia. The walled city of Intramuros, the older section of Manila, was a replica of the fortified town of sixteenth-century Europe, as was the earlier Portuguese Malacca. Batavia was likewise a fortified city, but the low terrain and abundant water encouraged the Dutch to copy the characteristic features of the cities of Holland. Thus old Batavia, the *Benedenstad*, was constructed on both sides of the Tjiliwong, and canals on a rectangular pattern were excavated.

Nearness to water, yet with freedom from flooding, was the essential requirement of all the cities, but seasonal variations in precipitation and periodic torrential downpours continue from time to time to defeat even modern techniques of civil engineering. The Batavian canals were only partly successful: in the wet seasons they flooded, and in dry periods they degenerated into a "dismal succession of filthy bogs and stagnant pools."[5] Pollution of the canals and the extension of the coastal swamps due to sedimentation gave old Batavia an evil reputation for disease.

Bangkok and Saigon, on low alluvial plains, with great seasonal fluctuations in river levels, were confronted with difficult problems. Official buildings commanded the little higher ground that was available, and the great bulk of the population lived in wooden houses built on stilts or on pontoons. Early Bangkok had no street pattern. The Royal City, or "Grand Palace," was a self-contained walled city, about a square mile in area, with palaces, temples, and administrative buildings. A canal across the neck of the bend in the Chao Phraya converted the old city into an island, outside which

[5] J. J. Stockdale: Sketches of the Island of Java (London, 1811), p. 129.

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permanent buildings and roads did not exist and all communication was by boat along the canals, or "klongs."

Singapore possessed the advantage of greater topographic variety. Eminences of granite formed good sites for public buildings, and the city spread out over the land above flood level on both sides of the swampy Singapore River.

All the old towns, with the exception of the architecturally exotic Bangkok, have a gridiron layout, which has meant the maximum of congestion in modern times. Racial zonation, well marked in the old towns, has tended to persist. Europeans have long since abandoned their old quarters, but the Chinese have remained in strength; indigenous peoples, however, are significantly absent. In Manila and Bangkok the old cores have been retained intact and new business and financial quarters have been created away from the old cities. Though Intramuros has lost its military functions and most of its administrative ones, it still keeps, in part, those of a judicial and religious nature. Old Bangkok, however, has lost little of its earlier importance and is one of the greatest tourist attractions in Southeast Asia. In Singapore and Jakarta the old core has been reconstructed as the business district, but since this took place before the advent of the motor vehicle, congestion is still acute. Saigon, having no old core and therefore able to plan its development without encumbrances, nevertheless also adopted a gridiron layout, but it is not easy to suggest an alternative that would have made better use of the environment.

The Expansion of the Cities

The rapid growth of the cities in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries has been due to the investment of capital, largely from the mother country, in production for export; the consequent improvement of the ports and the creation of a communications network focusing on them; a considerable increase in the scope of administrative activities; and, more recently, the establishment of secondary industries. Though these have provided the impetus, expansion has been possible only through the application of new techniques of engineering (particularly in drainage and water supply) and preventive medicine, making the cities as healthy as those of the West.

The three centuries of stagnation in Manila is a remarkable historical record. Expansion beyond the walls of Intramuros began almost a century later than the growth of old Batavia, which too had suffered a period of stagnation in the seventeenth century. Even the short British occupation (1762–1764) and the revolt of the American colonies failed to arouse Spanish interest in the distant possession, and the growth of Manila in the latter half

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361 of the nineteenth century was a reflection of the investment of foreign capital in the archipelago, stimulated by the opening of the Suez Canal. In 1863 relocation of the administrative area began, with the move of the Governor to the Malacañan Palace, north of the river, and in the last three decades of Spanish rule development on the north bank of the Pasig was rapid. [504] After the American occupation Manila grew quickly. A modern harbor was constructed on reclaimed land on the seaward side of Intramuros (1903), and the main development of the city was shifted south of the Pasig, where new [162] administrative and residential districts were created. Since World War II the city has again expanded, owing partly to an influx of population from the country, and partly to the use of reconstruction funds for development. The built-up area is now practically continuous from the swamps of the Bitas River mouth in the north to Parañaque in the south, a distance of about 10 miles. Northeast and southeast of the urban fringe, rice fields still cover the plain, and parts of the city itself are regularly flooded in the rainy season (April-October). Development has proceeded farthest inland on the higher ground between the coastal plain and the Marikina River, which drains southward to the Pasig. Here are the newer districts of Mandaluyong, San Juan del Monte, and Quezon City, the last virtually a satellite town, which is the new administrative center of the Republic.

341 As a result of its long history and changing administration, Manila has 361 a greater variety of architectural styles and street patterns than the other four cities. Old buildings of wood and adobe in the colonial style were found in Intramuros (which was largely destroyed in 1945) and occasionally outside, but in the main business district in Binondo and in the administrative quarter of Ermita modern steel-framed concrete buildings now predominate. Manila is not a city of skyscrapers. Good foundations are impossible in the alluvial sediments, and deep piling to reach the underlying granite or "floating" on enormous cellular rafts of concrete is necessary for large buildings in all the great cities. In the districts of earliest expansion, radiating plazas and boulevards are to be seen; elsewhere the gridiron layout of the typical American city has been adhered to, except in the newer areas to the east, where attempts have been made to relate development to 162 topography. Racial zonation is well marked. The Chinese community in- 361 habits the narrow streets north of the Escolta in the business quarter, and the principal indigenous residential areas lie north of the city in the crowded districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz. Europeans, Americans, and wealthy Filipinos reside on the higher ground in the districts of Ermita and Malate, south of the river.

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

FIG. 1—Location sketch map of Manila.

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361 Modern Batavia, the immediate forebear of Jakarta, dated from the reconstruction of the old city in the early nineteenth century. The expansion of trade and growth of population in the eighteenth century had made necessary the redevelopment of the town, still closely confined around the old fort. In 1808, Governor General Daendels moved the administrative headquarters to Buitenzorg (now Bogor), pulled down the old fort, and used the material for the construction of a new residential district some three miles south of the old town, on the higher ground of Weltevreden. Three miles south of the new district the military camp of Meester Cornelis was established, and thus the axis of future development was aligned north–south, avoiding the low rice-growing plains on each side.

Weltevreden, like the old town, was laid out on a rectangular pattern around large open squares, the Koningsplein and the Waterlooplein. Later in the nineteenth century the old city itself was largely rebuilt, and many of the canals were filled in, but the Town Hall and the buildings of the East India Company still remain. The old town is now the main business and financial district. Weltevreden has experienced several changes in the present century. The northern part between the Koningsplein and the Molenvliet, one of the surviving canals, has become a secondary business district, and its residential character is tending to disappear. The main European residential districts were in south Weltevreden and the newer Gondangdia and Menteng, where the street pattern is not so uniformly rectilinear. These new districts eventually linked up with the development around the military base of Meester Cornelis, and in 1935 the three old foci, Batavia, Weltevreden, and Meester Cornelis, were united in the Municipality of Batavia. [162] As in Manila, racial segregation was pronounced; the Chinese lived in the old town, and in the lacunae between the developments along the roads the indigenous peoples lived in kampongs, a veritable *rus in urbe*. Since the establishment of the Republic, the city, renamed Jakarta, has changed considerably. The kampong area has been greatly enlarged, and old Dutch street and district names have been discarded. Weltevreden has ceased to have a separate identity, and Meester Cornelis has become Djatinagara.

Bangkok owes its transformation from an overgrown floating village into a modern metropolis to the activities of King Chulalongkorn (1868–1910), the creator of modern Siam, whose reign marked the beginning of commercial rice cultivation in the Menam plain and the teak industry in the north. The development of Bangkok was closely bound up with the exporting and processing of both commodities. The Klong Ong Ang marks the first stage in the expansion of the city, to the east of the Grand Palace; development on the right bank was retarded by the absence of bridges over

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

FIG. 3.—Location sketch map of Jakarta.

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

FIG. 3—Location sketch map of Bangkok.

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the Chao Phraya, and even now there has been little expansion in that direction. At the end of the nineteenth century the filling in of the klongs and their replacement by roads were begun. The main axis of development was to the southeast, along the "New Road," as well as along the river. The expansion of commerce necessitated a business district, which was created in the Bangrak area, south of the Chinese quarter of Sampeng, and the increase in government functions led to an expansion of administration into Samsen and Dusit, to the north, while new European residential districts arose in the southeast. The west bank of the river, however, where the high tower of Wat Arun forms the most conspicuous landmark in the city, long remained an indigenous area, with a large population living in boats. The port has lagged behind in adaptation to changed technologies, and improved facilities are long overdue.

Saigon is virtually a twentieth-century city, though the construction of a business quarter and a modern port was begun shortly after the French occupation, and, as in the case of Bangkok, growth has been linked with the rice export trade. However, administration has been relatively more important than in any of the other cities. Before the creation of Vietnam, Cochin China was a French colony, governed from Saigon by French officials exclusively, and the city alternated with Hanoi as the residence of the Governor General of Indochina. With the loss of effective control over most of Tonkin, Saigon has become the main French base and center of power in Indochina.

The direction of expansion of the city has been westward toward Cholon, but Saigon is much more compact than any of the other great cities. The main business district lies in the southern part, close to the Arroyo Chinois, which links the Saigon River with Cholon. The shopping and administrative areas, characterized by wide boulevards, are a little to the northwest, and the European residential area lies on the "Plateau" to the north, a few feet above sea level. Cholon is a complete contrast, and until the war it had a much larger population. Unlike Saigon, which has a rectangular pattern of broad streets, Cholon has grown haphazardly along its many waterways. In 1932 the two cities were combined in a special administrative area, but they have remained largely independent of each other. Saigon is mainly concerned with administration and port activities, whereas Cholon has developed as the principal industrial area of Indochina. As in Jakarta, the enormous postwar increase in population has resulted in a great expansion in the area occupied by temporary dwellings, around the city margins.

The founder of Singapore did not omit to provide his city with a plan

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

FIG. 4—Location sketch map of Saigon-Cholon.



FIG. 5—Location sketch map of Singapore.

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for development.[6] The early mercantile and financial quarter was on the right bank of the Singapore River, where it has remained ever since. Raffles planned a racial residential zonation, the Chinese to be confined to the right bank above the business district, the Europeans to inhabit the opposite bank. Though this was eventually abandoned, Singapore's "Chinatown," with the highest population density in the city, still marks the old Chinese area. The early gridiron pattern was continued in the development to the east, the first direction of expansion. In the nineteenth century the city began to expand onto the somewhat higher land to the north, and here the new European residential district of Tanglin arose; but commercial interests are steadily invading the older part of the better residential areas to the north. With the reclamation in the last 50 years of the numerous swamps that set limits to expansion the lacunae in development have been filled in, and the city sprawls along the south coast of the island for more than 10 miles. Indeed, at no great date in the future the whole island will be effectively urbanized. The Armed Services occupy large areas, and their establishments constitute in effect separate towns. Room for expansion is becoming increasingly difficult to find, but the city's public housing achievements, particularly the new development at Tiong Bahru, on the west side, are worthy of note as being among the best in Asia.

In appearance the five cities are not greatly dissimilar to cities of the West, but there is a more clearly defined zonation of commercial, industrial, and residential development, the last showing a racial differentiation, which, though everywhere tending to break down, is nevertheless still conspicuous. Differences are also discernible in the suburbs, with their two-story "shop-houses," and above all in the outer margins, where "temporary" houses of wood thatched with nipa palm cluster together in overgrown kampongs or barrios, engulfed by the outward sprawl of the cities. Here large numbers of indigenous people live in an environment that is neither urban nor rural.

The central business and "downtown" districts are entirely nonindigenous. International banks, commodity exchanges, and great mercantile houses reproduce all the features of the business quarter of the Western city, though there is a steady infiltration by Indian and Chinese financial and mercantile interests. The main shopping areas are also predominantly European, though here again Chinese and Indian establishments are numerous. Congestion is proportionately as great as in the Western city, and none suffers worse in this respect than Manila. Binondo, the main business district, lies on the

[6] For a full account see E. H. G. Dobby: Singapore: Town and Country, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 30, 1940, pp. 84–109.

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361 north bank of the Pasig, and circulation is impeded by the bridges over the river; approach from the north is slowed by bottlenecks where narrow bridges span the many small canals, or *esteros*, which make the district virtually an island.

Administration is a main function of the five cities. So far as Jakarta and Singapore are concerned, it is highly likely that the gradual growth of a parliamentary democracy in the mother country, which necessitated an increase in the size of the colonial administration,[7] was a dominant factor in city growth; similar tendencies have been observed in the other cities, though the degree varies considerably. The administrative areas are distinct, but the enormous growth in official business in the last 25 years and the expansion of the cities have necessitated some decentralization of administrative functions. Only Singapore is not an official capital, but despite the creation of an administrative capital for the Federation of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur, Singapore is unlikely to suffer from this apparent loss of government business.[8]

The Ports and Their Functions

504 361 In the cities of Southeast Asia, lacking the heavy industrialization that has accompanied the development of ports in the West, port functions are relatively more important. Nevertheless, in any great port a certain amount of industrialization is inevitable, and the cities already possess a considerable industrial variety.

Unlike the smaller ports of their respective territories, which serve mainly local needs, the five cities are international ports, with a commerce that is becoming more widespread as the ties of former colonies with the homeland are loosened. The ports handle a large proportion of the export trade of their territories, but an even larger proportion of the import trade; distribution is thus a principal function in the economic life of the cities.

The modern ports, constructed on reclaimed land, are entirely artificial, but nowhere, even in the tidal ports of Bangkok and Saigon, are enclosed basins necessary. The modern ports, however, have not completely succeeded in displacing the old harbors; the Pasig and Singapore Rivers continue to carry a heavy lighter traffic from vessels in the Roads, with a great saving in port dues.

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[7] Amry Vandenbosch: The Dutch East Indies (3rd edit., Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1942), p. 75.

[8] Nevertheless, Singapore still is, as it always was, an administrative center of the first importance. The Colony has its own government offices, and also those of the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia. It contains the headquarters of the Far Eastern Naval, Military, and Air Forces of the British Commonwealth, and many Commonwealth and foreign consular and diplomatic offices. Finally, the City of Singapore has its own Municipal Council, which is responsible for the administration of many public utilities.

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Manila is unusual in possessing two harbors, one north of the Pasig, which handles the large interisland traffic, and the main harbor for trans-oceanic vessels, south of the entrance to the river. The Pasig itself is dredged to a depth of 18 feet as far as Jones Bridge, and is lined with quays. Native craft carry a considerable traffic upstream and along the many esteros. Manila normally handles about 30 per cent of the total export trade of the Philippine Republic, and more than 90 per cent of the imports.

With some 30 million tons of shipping entering and clearing annually, Singapore is one of the world's great ports. The functional pattern is similar to that of Manila. The modern port of Keppel Harbor handles most of the trade with the more distant parts of Asia and the rest of the world, and much of the entrepôt trade with South China and the rest of Southeast Asia is handled in the Roads. The political separation of Singapore from the Federation of Malaya complicates assessment of the trade of the port, since official statistics now exclude trade with the Federation; though it is not quite clear what proportion of Singapore's trade is conducted with the Federation. In 1951 the port handled 74 per cent of Malaya's imports and 67 per cent of the exports. Singapore shares with Bangkok the distinction of exporting more by value than it imports; the other ports all have an "unfavorable" trade balance. The great naval base, considerably enlarged since the war, is well removed from the commercial port; it lies on Johore Strait, some 17 miles from the city, almost as far distant as the Cavite base is from Manila.

Tanjoengpriok, the port of Jakarta, is of all the modern ports the farthest from the city center. Its construction some six miles northeast of the city was necessitated by the silting of the Tjiliwong, which has built up an expanse of mud flats along the coast more than a mile in width; the flats have, however, been put to productive use through the excavation of fishponds. The old harbor, connected with the modern port by the Antjol Canal, does not compare in importance with the Singapore River or the Pasig, nor does the rather large coastal and interisland trade have an independent harbor, as in Manila, though one of the Tanjoengpriok basins is used almost exclusively for this purpose. In the unrest that preceded the formation of the Indonesian Republic, the trade of Tanjoengpriok decreased greatly, but since 1950 recovery has been rapid. Some ground, however, has been lost to other ports: in 1951 Tanjoengpriok handled only 10 per cent of the exports of Indonesia, though its share of the imports was better maintained, with some 52 per cent of the national total.

Saigon is both a commercial and a naval port, though as a naval base it cannot rival Singapore or Cavite. It is approached by way of the Saigon

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504 361 River, which, though possessing adequate depth for vessels up to 30 feet in draft, has a sinuous channel, which prevents ships longer than 550 feet from ascending to the port. The strong scour of the semidiurnal tides reduces the necessity for dredging. The port occupies about three miles of the right bank of the river and is divided into three sections. Overseas trade is handled by the quays between the Arroyo Chinois and the Canal de Dérivation, in the Khan Hoi district; smaller vessels use the quays nearer the city; and the naval port lies farthest upstream, close to the Arroyo de l'Avalanche. Lighters convey cargoes from ships anchored in the river below the city to wharves along the Arroyo Chinois and the Canal de Dérivation, the twin waterways that link Saigon with Cholon. Before 1939, Saigon handled about 40 per cent of the total foreign trade of Indochina; rice formed about 50 per cent by weight of the exports. At the present time the military operations taking place in the country have greatly reduced the trade of Saigon, and the rice export is only some 100,000 tons a year.

Bangkok alone of all the ports is still inaccessible to large ocean-going vessels. A bar at the mouth of the Menam Chao Phraya prevents entry, and the terminal for large vessels has long been Gaw Si Kang, an island in the Gulf of Siam east of the river mouth. From Gaw Si Kang strings of lighters are drawn by tugs to the wharves of Bangkok, which extend for about six miles along the left bank below the Grand Palace. The dredging of the bar to allow ocean-going vessels to reach the port would have presented no great difficulties, but opposition from the lightering interests prevented anything from being done until shortly before the war, when work was begun on a new port at Klong Toi, about five miles below the city. It is now proposed, as part of a plan to expand rice cultivation in Thailand, to deepen the channel so that vessels of 26-foot draft can ascend to the port. Bangkok has an almost complete monopoly of the foreign trade of Thailand, and in a real sense it is the only port of the country.

Industrial Development

32 361 38 39 The five cities contain a large proportion of the total industrial capacity of their respective territories. Industry is well represented, though much of it is better described as processing than as manufacturing, and its range of activities is continually increasing. The primary processing of foodstuffs and raw materials is dominant; rice milling is particularly important, except in Singapore, but rubber, copra, sago, tapioca, hemp, sugar, and tobacco all assume considerable local significance. A beginning has been made with the higher stages of manufacturing, such as rubber products and even foam

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rubber, in Singapore; other manufactures are furniture, boats, footwear, glass, bricks and tiles, oils and soaps, electric batteries, and certain chemical products. Manufacturing industries proper use relatively little machinery and power and produce for the home market, in which there is a considerable element of local protection. Food and drink industries are well developed (including brewing and distilling); textiles are poorly developed. Heavy industry is confined to the repair and refitting of vessels. All the ports have forges and foundries for making minor repairs; Singapore and Jakarta, which have dry-dock facilities, can undertake more extensive work. Repair shops for maintenance of railway equipment are located in all the cities except Singapore; the assembly of imported motor vehicles is carried on in Manila, Jakarta, and Singapore. Industry relies largely on electric power, which is expensive because of the paucity of local coal supplies.

Small-scale industry is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese; the larger undertakings are overwhelmingly European-owned, though there are some large Chinese industrial establishments. Only a small proportion of the inhabitants of the cities are engaged in industry: in Singapore, where industry is expanding rapidly, only 11 per cent of the adult working population were employed in industrial establishments in the census of 1947. This unduly low figure does not take account of the large employment in the establishments of the Armed Services, much of which was industrial.

The industrial areas lie close to the port or along the rivers and canals. They are surrounded by areas of high population density; for the relatively high cost and limited availability of public transport operate to retard the divorce of place of work and residence, which is so conspicuous a feature of the Western city. Newer industrial areas, however, are appearing on the margins of the cities, and as the range of industrial activity grows, industry is likely to become more widely dispersed.

POPULATION

All the five cities would have probably reached the one-million level in a comparatively short period if the war had not intervened. During the Japanese occupation, population decreased in the cities because of the shortage of food, and the wartime dislocation that elsewhere in Asia resulted in a large influx of rural dwellers into the cities did not operate here. With the end of the war the tide set strongly in the opposite direction. The breakdown of effective administration in many parts of Southeast Asia following the Japanese surrender, armed insurrections against the central governments, the struggle for independence, the depredations of extreme

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factions, and the difficulty of protecting disliked minorities, particularly the Chinese, all combined to attract many rural dwellers to the comparative safety of the cities. This immigration of refugees was perhaps greatest in Saigon-Cholon: from a population of about 300,000 at the time of the Japanese occupation the twin cities have increased to an estimated 1,400,000. Jakarta has grown almost as spectacularly. At the census of 1930 the city of Batavia had a population of a little more than half a million; by 1950 the Indonesian government estimated Jakarta's population to be not less than two million; and at present the city may well contain nearer three million. Even on the most conservative estimate it is by far the most populous city in the whole of Southeast Asia.

In the census of 1948, Greater Manila had a population of 1,180,000; however, several separately recorded districts of Rizal Province are integral parts of the built-up area, and their inclusion raises the total to more than a million and a quarter. The 14 districts of the City of Manila proper showed a 58 per cent increase over the 1939 census figures. Singapore and Bangkok have been relatively unaffected by postwar immigration from the country. In the intercensal period 1931–1947 the population of the island of Singapore grew by some 68 per cent, owing to the gradual establishment of an equality in the sex composition of the Chinese population, together with a steady decline in the death rate; allowing for natural increase since the census, the population of Singapore Colony at present is about 1,100,000, of whom about 70 per cent reside in the municipal area. Before the war Bangkok was approaching 900,000, but in the census of 1947 the population was only 1,116,600;[9] hence the war may have somewhat retarded the city's growth.

The present rate of growth due to natural increase seems to be about 3 per cent a year in all the cities, which is much higher than the rate in their respective national territories. This will present many difficult problems of development. As might be expected, the already overcrowded districts have experienced the greatest increases; in Manila, for example, the districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz have increased their populations by 80 per cent or more since 1939. As compared with Western cities, densities in the poorest areas are extremely high; 1500 persons to an acre would not be excessive for the net density of the worst blocks.[10] On the other hand, density

[9] With Thonburi. According to the *Statistical Year Book of Thailand*, N.S., Vol. 1, 1952, recently received, the total for the two is 1,178,881.

[10] Net density is the average density of the population of a given residential area, which consists solely of the dwellings and one-half of the width of streets giving access thereto. The figure quoted here is an estimate by the Singapore Improvement Trust of the situation in the most overcrowded part of the city.

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development in the best residential districts is very low, frequently one or two houses to an acre, so that the cities sprawl widely.

From the beginning, Chinese immigrants have constituted an important element of the cities. At first encouraged, and later feared, by the authorities, the Chinese were confined to special quarters, such as the famous Parián of Manila, where they have tended to remain. Dislike of them has been a universal rallying point of numerous indigenous politicians, and the murder of many Chinese in the period following the Japanese collapse recalls the massacres of the early history of Manila and Batavia. Where immigration has been comparatively free, at least until fairly recent times, the Chinese have become a majority: Singapore is more than 77 per cent Chinese—the largest Chinese community outside China—and in Bangkok more than 60 per cent of the population are Chinese or of mixed Chinese-Thai ancestry. The lower proportions of Chinese in the other three cities are due to the earlier restrictions on immigration, together with an influx of indigenous peoples from rural areas in the postwar period. Events in China, however, have everywhere increased illegal Chinese immigration. The removal of many Chinese from rural Cochin China to the Saigon-Cholon area has raised the percentage of Chinese in Cholon to about 60, and it is probably not less than 30 in the combined cities. In Manila and Jakarta it is much lower, and the total number of Chinese is not easy to estimate; both cities contain more than 50,000, and the number of persons of mixed Chinese and indigenous blood is undoubtedly much larger. Despite many vicissitudes, the Chinese have proved indispensable, and their importance in the economic life of the cities can hardly be overstated.

Europeans constitute only a very small proportion of the population of the cities. Only in prewar Batavia did they amount to as much as 5 per cent of the total, and this was in part due to the inclusion of Eurasians as Europeans in the Dutch statistics. Of the other immigrant groups, the most numerous are Indians and Pakistanis, who in Singapore made up 7 per cent of the population in 1947. Jakarta has a small community of Arabs, engaged in shopkeeping or moneylending.

The indigenous peoples have a higher birth rate than the immigrant peoples, but also a higher death rate, so that the relative proportions of the two groups have tended to remain the same. Lately the migration of indigenous peoples to the cities, especially in the new independent states, has altered the balance somewhat, and the partly alien character of the cities may tend to decline. Simultaneously, restrictions have been placed on the economic activities of the Chinese in the Philippines and Thailand, but the outcome of these measures is unlikely to be that intended.

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The Future of the Cities

●361 The future of the great cities remains problematic. They have attained their present size and pre-eminence through their role as intermediaries in the interchange of foodstuffs and raw materials with the manufactured products of the West, but this activity has been carried on entirely by aliens. So long as this economic pattern persists, the great port cities will continue to occupy a leading position in the life of Southeast Asia. But the pattern may not persist, and it is clear that the economic development of Southeast Asia will include an increasing attention to home production of both foodstuffs and manufactures. Southeast Asia may return to the political instability of precolonial times; it may become part of the Communist sphere; or it may succeed in maintaining neutrality between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. In any event, the great cities cannot escape some readjustment, and they may well lose ground to other centers. Already there is opposition to the dominant position of the great city in national affairs. If extremist elements prevail, it appears likely that other cities may come to the fore; just as Shanghai has been supplanted by a revived Peking, so the victory of Vietminh would be likely to confer supremacy on Tonkin. The future of Singapore is particularly difficult to forecast, since it is the only city that is not an administrative capital of a state. Its integration into the Federation of Malaya would give the immigrant Chinese numerical superiority and would be strongly resisted by the Malays of the peninsula. Political changes in China and Southeast Asia itself may make the entrepôt trade difficult to maintain, and as a center of world communications Singapore has already lost ground to Bangkok, which is better placed for trans-Asian and trans-Pacific air routes. Moreover, its utter dependence on outside sources for food,[11] and to some extent for water, must greatly limit its usefulness as a strategic base—problems that have already given rise to some concern. Of all the cities, only Bangkok appears to be without a potential rival, despite an attempt in 1945 to relocate the administrative capital.[12] It may well be that the great cities' brightest future lies in an increase in the range and pace of industrialization.

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[11] "Food Supplies for Singapore," Singapore, 1951.

[12] Bangkok's central position in Southeast Asia, equidistant from South and Far East Asia, is reflected in its selection as the headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

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THE GREAT CITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA[1]

NORTON S. GINSBURG

ABSTRACT

A major characteristic of urbanization in Southeast Asia is the functional dominance, with two minor exceptions, of one great metropolis in each of the countries of the region. These cities have acted as the head-links between the West and the indigenous societies. They are in a state of rapid social change, associated with the granting of political autonomy to the former colonial nations, with the accelerated rise of nationalism, and the increasing centralization of political functions in the national capitals.

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Standards for defining urban populations differ, but it can be assumed safely that no more than 15 per cent of the 175 million people of Southeast Asia belong in an urban category.[2] In contrast, in the United States, with a population somewhat smaller than that of Southeast Asia as a whole, over 64 per cent of the population is classified as urban.

Estimates for 1952 indicate only 30 cities or urban agglomerations with populations of 100,000 or more.[3] In the United States, however, there are 160 such urban areas; in the Soviet Union, with a population of 200 millions, there are about 120; and in Japan, with one-half the population of Southeast Asia, there are 64. In Southeast Asia only an estimated 7 per cent of the total population lives in cities of 100,000 or more; less in Burma, Indochina, Thailand, and Indonesia; somewhat more in the Philippines. Only Malaya, including Singapore, departs

[1] Revised from a paper read before the Far Eastern Association in Spring, 1954.

121 As used here, "urbanization" connotes not only mere numerical increases in the population of cities but also the development of an urban way of life and the accompanying changes in value orientation (cf. Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1938).

[3] Census data for Southeast Asia are notably incomplete. In Burma, Thailand, and the Associated States of Indochina the "urban" population is estimated to be little more than 10 per cent of the whole; in Indonesia still less; but in the Philippines some 24 per cent of the population is classified as urban; and in Malaya, including the Crown Colony of Singapore, about 35 per cent. Without Singapore, only 27 per cent of the Malayan population is classified as urban.

113 [3] *United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1952.*

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significantly from the norm, with 18 per cent of its population living in large urban clusters. In the United States, on the other hand, nearly 30 per cent of the population lives in such large cities.

Southeast Asia retains many characteristics of a frontier region, with large areas of sparse population, and so it seems paradoxical that its population density is 95 per square mile, as compared with 50 in the United States, 23 in the Soviet Union, and 617 in Japan. Clearly there is no single correlation between densities and urbanization. The explanation lies in the structure of the urban hierarchy within the region. Whereas in the United States there is a notable gradation of cities from larger to smaller, and only 18 per cent of the urban population lives in cities of one million population or more, in Southeast Asia the urban population is most clearly associated with the largest cities. For example, in Thailand, half of the urban population lives in one metropolis, Bangkok, and the rest is distributed among a large number of smaller cities and towns, the largest of which contains no more than 35,000 people. Bangkok, therefore, may be regarded as a true Primate City, that is, a city with many times the population of the next largest city and a multiplicity of functions and attractions which give it dominance.[4] The Primate City is characteristic of the so-called "great cities" in Southeast Asia, with few exceptions.[5] Such are, in

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[4] Mark Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Review*, April, 1939.

[5] For an excellent description of several of these great cities upon which this paper is based in part see D. W. Fryer, "The 'Million City' in Southeast Asia," *Geographical Review*, October, 1953.

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

Burma, Rangoon; in Thailand, Bangkok; in the Philippines, Manila; and in Malaya, Singapore. In Indochina, however, there are two major core regions, each with its regional capital, but Saigon is clearly dominant over Hanoi, which for reasons of population size alone must be regarded as a lesser city.[6] In Indonesia densely populated Java has two large cities, Jakarta and Surabaya, the first only twice the size of the second, but Jakarta is the Primate City, if less clearly than Bangkok or Rangoon. In each case, other than Indonesia, the Primate City is from five to ten times as large as the next largest city, and there is no such graded hierarchy of urbanization as in the United States and to a considerable degree in Western European countries and Japan. Secondary cities, such as Mandalay in Burma, Makassar and Jogjakarta in Indonesia, and Cebu in the Philippines, tend to be regional capitals subordinate to a great metropolis.

The rapid population growth of the six greatest metropolitan centers—Rangoon, Bangkok, Saigon, Manila, Singapore, and Jakarta—suggest that national urbanization may be proceeding as rapidly in Southeast Asia as in any other part of the world.[7] This may be true, but it can be argued also that the overwhelming dominance of the Primate City inhibits the growth of lesser cities and that the largest cities will expand more rapidly than the lesser ones.[8] There are in effect only a limited number of services to be performed by cities within a predominantly village and folk society, although it may be industrializing slowly, and the great cities continue to possess a virtual monopoly of these services. Thus, even as a society changes, new and increasingly complex functions tend to be performed by institutions

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[6] According to the *Annuaire statistique du Vietnam, 1949–50*, the population of Hanoi was 216,900 in 1950. Its port, Haiphong, had a population of 146,000. The total population of the two is only about one-fifth that of the twin cities of Saigon-Cholon.

[7] Between 1939 and 1948 the population of Greater Manila increased by 55 per cent. Between 1931 and 1947 the population of Singapore Town (now City) increased by 52.5 per cent.

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178 already established in the Primate cities. So, to a very large degree, in Southeast Asia
162 growth is primarily in the great cities,[9]
369 whereas in the United States in the last three decades at least growth has been more
361 rapid in the small and intermediate cities.

Although the rates of urbanization are high, being, in the case of the Philippines nearly twice the rate of population growth,[10] no sudden transformation to an urbanized society can be envisaged. The percentage of total population classified as urban is in general so low and the normal rates of population increase so high that the growth of urban population *as a percentage of total population* has not been spectacular. In the Philippines, for example, the urban population increased merely from 23.3 per cent in 1939 to 24.1 per cent in 1948, largely in the Manila area. The apparent positive correlation between social change and rates of urban population growth also is exceptionally high. To illustrate with a negative example, in Thailand, where recent social change has been minimal, the rapid population growth of Bangkok has been equaled and even exceeded by that of a number of rural *changwats* in the central and southeastern parts of the country. Under at least two conditions, however, the great cities have increased their populations enormously and at shocking rates: (1) where enlarged political functions have been acquired since the war and (2) where rural unrest and insecurity have

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[9] The only apparent major exception to this generalization is Singapore and Malaya, where the lesser towns have tended to increase their populations equally rapidly since 1931. This situation may be explained by the special political and economic status of Singapore, the entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia, and the exceptional degree of commercialization in the Malayan economy as a whole (see M. V. del Tufo, *A Report on the 1947 Census of Population [Malaya, Comprising the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore]* [London, 1949]).

[9] E.g., Greater Manila accounted for 89 per cent of the 1939–48 growth of the seven largest cities in the Philippines.

[10] Between 1939 and 1948 the approximate rate of total population growth was 20 per cent; that of urban population growth, nearly 40 per cent.

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178 caused or hastened a flight to the relative security of the city. These forces have been 162 operating in combination particularly in 369 Rangoon, Jakarta, Saigon, and Manila and largely are responsible for their extremely 361 rapid postwar growth. Lesser cities in Java, for example, such as Surabaya, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surakarta, also have increased in population because of rural insecurity; and in Burma in several towns and cities up to 50 per cent of the population has been resident less than four years, for the same reasons. These migrations have not, however, necessarily been accompanied by greater employment opportunities and consequently cannot be regarded as indexes of more rapid urbanization and associated socioeconomic change.

184 The great cities of Southeast Asia possess many features in common, not the least of 361 which is their youth. This quality they share also with several of the great cities of the 369 United States, but there the resemblance ceases.[11] In 1800 Rangoon, Saigon, and 175 Singapore did not yet exist in city form; 178 Bangkok, the new capital of Thailand, was less than twenty years old; Manila and Batavia (Jakarta), though then about two hundred years old, were merely small coastal towns. They began to grow rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the development of the treaty ports in China, the opening of Japan, the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, the opening of the

[11] For the most part the growth of the Southeast Asian cities was not associated with a total transformation of society but with a strong indigenous tradition, as in the case of Bangkok, or with the juxtaposition of a segment of a new civilization alongside the old, as in the case of Rangoon. In America the cities represented the culmination of a social transformation in a virtually unoccupied frontier region. The same is true of Manchuria, the northeastern frontier of pioneer settlement in China, which is more recently, and more highly, urbanized than any other part of China. In Manchuria, as in the United States, there is a quite regular gradation of city sizes, and the Primate City cannot be clearly identified.

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Suez Canal in 1869, and the consolidation of Western control, direct or indirect, over most of Southeast Asia in the 1890's, followed by American acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

More important, the great cities were, and to a large degree still are, foreign creations, essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape. Although several began as native settlements, they developed as foreign exclaves on the margins of Asia, in much the same way as did the plantation system and mining operations. With the exception of Bangkok, they represented and functioned as the overseas appendages of Western, not indigenous, interests, being what Spate has called "head-links"—the gates by which Western concepts entered to destroy and build and in which a new system of economic organization evolved.[12] Indeed, the concept of the Asian plural society was inspired by the contrast between the basically foreign great city and the indigenous agricultural village. The ties of the great city with its hinterland were primarily commercial and associated with foreign-controlled mining and plantation interests and with Chinese-dominated rice trade. Such direct political-administrative ties as did exist were restricted primarily to indigenous elites, small in number, which allied themselves with Western interests. Where the indigenous rural populations were affected by these urban-rural relations, it was primarily through the plantation or the mining system, both of which needed a large labor force, or through Indian or Chinese intermediaries.

On the other hand, the relations between an indigenous capital, like Bangkok in its earlier period, or Kyoto or Peking, and the agrarian society upon which it was based were of quite a different order. In these cases the capital represented the culmination of what might be termed a national *ethos*, the epitome of what Redfield has

[12] O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital Cities," *Geographical Review*, October, 1942, p. 628.

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called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13]

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954.

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localised according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailama, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

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cubicles behind and above.[16] Usually constructed in continuous rows and back to back, this type of tenement is among the more conspicuous evils in Southeast Asian cities. On the urban peripheries and wherever interstices appear in the modern street and housing pattern, slum villages appear which consist of house clusters usually constructed of bamboo and *atap* palm, highly inflammable and unsanitary.[17] These also are found in and on the margins of the lesser cities but are most striking in juxtaposition to the sleek boulevards of Singapore, Bangkok, and Jakarta.

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A further index of the cultural and economic pluralism of the great cities is their frequent division into old and new towns. In China, especially in the treaty ports, this distinction is usually between an old Chinese and a modern foreign city. The same is true of India. In Southeast Asia the contrast is most often between an old and a modern town both of Western origin, as in Jakarta, Manila, Singapore, and Rangoon. To a notable degree each of these is also a planned city. In Saigon the contrast is between predominantly Chinese Cholon and Saigon itself. In Bangkok, however, there are the old Siamese castle town, a new town of indigenous origin, though of European design, and a Chinese town or quarter nearly as old as the castle town itself. Pluralism is seen not merely in the division of a city into old and new parts or into quarters but also in the separation of the predominantly outward-oriented great city from an up-coun-

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[16] For a description of the "shophouse" see R. H. Hughes, "Hong Kong: An Urban Study," *Geographical Journal*, March, 1951, pp. 9–10.

[17] These areas, the so-called "kampongs," are historically enclaves of the countryside within the city. They form small social cells which together cover most of the surface area in and on the margins of the great cities. Separately, they constitute the rural villages, which in the densely settled portions of Java, for example, are so closely spaced that they collectively exhibit population densities as high as those in many cities (see photographs in J. M. Fraser, "Town Planning and Housing in Singapore," *Town Planning Review*, January, 1953).

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try, indigenous, cultural or political subcenter. Just as Shanghai had its Nanking and Peking, so Rangoon has its Mandalay, Jakarta its Jogjakarta, Manila its Cebu, and, in a variant form, Singapore its Kuala Lumpur.

In the past these cities sited along the Asian littoral have been the funnels through which produce from the interiors have reached tidewater and the world of commerce and Western manufactures have penetrated. Through the increasingly metropolitan channels have flowed the ideas of the West as well as its material goods. In a sense they have acted both as a catalyst for social and economic change and as a cushion which modified the shock of the earlier cultural contacts.

With the exception of Singapore, the site of each of the great cities of Southeast Asia is an ill-drained riverine or coastal lowland strategically placed in relation to an exceptionally productive agricultural region. Again, with the exception of Singapore, none possesses a deep natural harbor suitable for modern ocean-going shipping. The three mainland ports are both river and ocean ports and must be reached through tortuous and shallow river channels. All are entrepôts. Jakarta and Manila are located on the most highly developed islands of the archipelagoes, for which they act as entrepôts. Only in Indonesia and Indochina are there major competitors for the two greatest ports —Haiphong, the outlet for the densely populated Tonkin delta, and Surabaya, the regional capital for the Great East of the Indies, itself an empire. Each great port virtually dominates the national import trade; all tend, however, to share some part of the national export trade with lesser ports. In spite of these great similarities, the nature and functions of the ports differ markedly. As Allen observes: "All ports are individual. History, geography, politics, and economics all contribute to making them as they are. Few universal principles apply, and attempts to force uniformity on ports which have grown up differently are bound to tail."[18] Singapore, for example, is one of the

504 world's great ports and the most Western of
361 the great cities of Southeast Asia. A Crown Colony, it is the only great city without a large administrative hinterland, although it is the seat of the British High Commissioner
[175] for Southeast Asia. Since its founding by Raffles in 1819, it has been a free port and an entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia. About half of the 5.5 million tons of cargo that pass over Singapore's modern wharves originates outside of the Malayan peninsula, and it was not until 1924 that the island of Singapore was connected by causeway with the mainland. At the same time it handles two-thirds of Malaya's exports and about three-fourths of its imports by value. Increasingly, its interests have tended to focus upon Malaya itself, as its entrepôt functions have been cut into by the other great ports within the region, especially Jakarta. What has kept Singapore the largest port in Southeast Asia (over 20 million net tons of shipping entered in 1952) is its status as a free port and its strategic location at the western entrance to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean basin. As a crossroad between the Pacific and Indian oceans, it attracts shipping from great distances. It
[508] also has become an important air center, and a new airfield is under construction north-
[368] east of the city. Finally, the concentration of banking, insurance, light industry, docking, repair, and outfitting facilities have fortified its dominant position.

361 Singapore City was originally laid out
563 with due regard for ethnic quarters.[19] The oldest section of the city, however, has become the business center, but the rest of the older town is a densely populated Chinese section, and much of the newer town to the northeast also is Chinese. Each of these areas is in turn divided on the basis of Chinese clan categories. The European residen-

[18] D. F. Allen, *Report on the Major Ports of Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1951), p. 128.

[19] For a general description of the city see E. H. G. Dobby, "Singapore: Town and Country," *Geographical Review*, January, 1940, and the *Colony of Singapore Annual Report*.

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tial area is primarily on higher ground in the northern part of the city. The University of Malaya is located in Singapore, though plans are being made to move it to Johore Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatriate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as the site of a new Chinese-language regional university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopolitan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps more so than any of the other great cities of the region.

At the other extreme is Bangkok, most indigenous of the great cities. Founded as the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the Bangkok skyline with a character of its own. The city is located on the left bank of the Menam Chao Phya within the southernmost great bend of the river some twenty miles from its mouth. Exceptional problems of poor drainage plagued the city from the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals have given it the rather misleading title of the "Venice of the East."

A Chinese city early appeared to the southeast of the original castle town and in time became part of the central business district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to become roads, the city continued to expand. A new city appeared on the northern outskirts of the old, a planned creation built in the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards and buildings ranging from shocking Victorian variations on Italian Renaissance to more recent battleship modern. The contrast between the façade of modern buildings fronting these boulevards and the stilted, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

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Bang Kok

361 behind them is one of the most striking
34 demonstrations of cultural dualism in South-
184 east Asia.

Unlike the other great cities, Bangkok
175 originated as the capital of a land-oriented
361 agrarian state. Its proximity to tidewater
was accidental. In 1822 the ship bearing the
504 Crawfurd mission to the Thai court barely
177 was able to cross the bar at the mouth of the
Menam, then covered by only four feet of
178 water.[2] Its poor harbor and its remoteness from the major shipping routes of the South China Sea conspired to retard the development of the city as a port until the end of the nineteenth century and to retain it as an anachronism in Southeast Asia—a growing city, nearly great, surely primate, but indigenous rather than Western. Nevertheless, since it was through Bangkok that Western influences filtered into Thailand, it is a case of an indigenous capital acting as a revolutionary medium for socioeconomic change.

504 Bangkok is still the least convenient port
361 of the great cities in Southeast Asia. The bar across the mouth of the Chao Phya was dredged through only in 1952, and port facilities are modest as compared with the other cities. Indeed, most vessels still anchor in the Bight of Bangkok in the lee of the island, Kao Hsi Kang, at the mouth of the Chao Phya and transship their cargoes to and from river barges and country boats which link the island with Bangkok. Surprisingly, the freight tonnage handled at Bangkok is about one-third that of Singapore, although the volume of shipping is only one-tenth as large. The explanation lies partly in the large bulk shipments of rice which form the main export. Partly, also, there is a lower load factor at Singapore, since much of the shipping which enters its harbor is as much dependent on the local complex of service facilities as on cargo potential. At Bangkok, peripheral as it is to the main trade routes, few vessels call without assurances of sizable cargoes.

[2] See J. Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China* (London: H. Colburn & R. Bentley, 1830).

On the other hand, changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient.

The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence.

[i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

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On the other hand, the war also brought increased American influence into the region, and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of the symbols of change that sooner or later will be followed by changes in urban facilities and urban organization.

More important, the present period is associated with an increasing intensification of the economic activities of government and a corresponding diminution of foreign enterprise. Political and administrative functions have become increasingly important since the war. Since the main governmental organs are concentrated in the largest centers, the direct influence of the great city upon the country in which it is primate is likewise increasing. Relations between nationalized city and an increasingly money-oriented countryside are becoming more intimate, and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinctiveness of city and country is rapidly becoming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of the great city's leading a revival of ancient value systems, as some extreme ethnocentrists hope it will, is small. Only one prediction can be made: the days of the culturally alien and ethnically distinct urban center are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city like Singapore becomes increasingly an anomalous relict of an age now past.

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on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

Moreover, in any comparison between South East Asia and the peasantry of Europe, quite apart from differences in the production of crops other than the staple grain, there is an important difference in the average size of the holdings worked. The South East Asian peasant has fewer acres than the peasantry of Europe. In France, a country of peasant agriculture, about 40 per cent of the total number of agricultural holdings in 1931 were less than 2½ acres apiece; the average size of this group of holdings was 1½ acres each. But about 45 per cent of the total holdings were between 2½ and 22½ acres, with an average of about 10 acres each. There are areas in South East Asia where the average size of peasant holdings is fairly large. In Cochin China, while 72 per cent of the landowners have holdings between 2½ and 12 acres, there are provinces where more than half of them have holdings above 12 acres in size. In Siam, too, the average peasant holding seems of tolerable size—4 acres or so in the south and north east, 5½ acres in the north, and 10½ acres in central Siam, where more than one-third of the rural families live. But in Java, in 1938, the average size of holdings was only just over 2 acres for all tax-paying landowners in the country. In the Tonkin delta of Indo-China, another large area of heavy concentration of peasantry, as much as 60 per cent of the peasants have been reckoned to own holdings of less than nine-tenths of an acre, and 90 per cent to have holdings of under 4½ acres apiece. It has been estimated that a peasant family needs for adequate support 2½ to 5 acres of land, cultivating it by 'wet rice' methods. Many sections of the farming population in Java and Indo-China, for instance, are obviously well below this critical level. Even though large-scale irrigation and very intensive land use, including double cropping of rice in the year and much use of secondary crops, may lower the critical figure considerably, the peasant in such conditions is always liable to have to seek work outside his holding or to put up with inadequate living standards, even in nutrition.

The difficulties of agriculture in such conditions are further increased by the fact that a man's holding is often not a single undivided farm, but a set of dispersed fields, some of very small size. This dispersion and fragmentation of holdings allows for some advantages in adapting crops to soil and water variations, and is some security against wholesale raids by pests, but it makes for technical difficulties in the use of implements and labour on any scale. Since the dispersion is due primarily to traditional customs of inheritance and marriage, efforts to secure consolidation are apt to be only of temporary benefit, though some success has attended administrative action against undue fragmentation.

The same comparatively low level of productivity is seen in fishing, which gives the one great source of animal protein to the South East Asian peasant's diet. Before the war a Malay peasant fisherman produced on the average 1½ tons of fish per head per annum and in 1947 nearly 1 ton per